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In April 2016 in two contributions to this blog Ron Johnston, Kelvyn Jones and David Manley predicted
the likely geography of support for Brexit in the EU referendum. In this concluding piece they compare their
predictions to the result. The general pattern of their predictions turned out to be very accurate, but regional
differences were more pronounced than anticipated, with variations in both late electoral registrations and turnout
introducing unexpected impacts on the geography of the outcome.
In an earlier contribution to this blog we challenged the claim that the pattern of voting in the EU Referendum was
unpredictable because there was no evidence that members of particular socio-economic and/or -demographic
groups were more likely to vote one way or another. Using a large body of polling data collected by YouGov (over
the whole of 2015 and first three months of 2016) we found clear evidence suggesting that young people and those
with higher-level educational qualifications were much more likely to support Remain, whereas older voters and
those with few or no qualifications were much more likely to support Leave.
Across 380 local authorities we used used this information to estimate the percentage of voters  who would support
Brexit (Northern Ireland and Gibraltar were excluded because we lacked enough data). Our map showed the
geography of support for a Brexit and caught the interest of a number of newspapers.
In a later blog, we adjusted our predictions to take turnout into account, based on the observed patterns at the 2015
general election. A revised map showed a slightly larger number of local authorities where majority support for
Leave was likely to occur.
How accurate were the predictions?
Nothing in later polling data suggested any change to the underlying patterns: older people were more likely than
their younger counterparts to vote Leave; well-qualified people were more likely than those with no or few
qualifications to vote Remain; and young voters, especially those with few qualifications, were least likely to turn out
and vote – assuming that they were on the electoral roll at all. The only difference was that whereas the poll data we
used showed a clear majority of support for Remain, by polling day the gap between the two sides was very small.
But unless those who switched from Remain to Leave were overwhelmingly concentrated in particular age and
qualification groups this should not have affected the overall pattern. The local authorities where we predicted
greatest support for Brexit should have been those which reported most votes for it on 23 June.
And that was the case. The graph shows our predicted percentage vote for Brexit on the horizontal axis, adjusted for
likely turnout, and the actual vote on the vertical axis. The relationship is close – although in virtually all cases the
Brexit vote is, unsurprisingly, larger than we predicted (in statistical terms, the correlation between the two sets of
values of 0.82 indicates that 67 per cent of the variation in the actual pattern can be accounted for by the variation in
the predicted pattern).
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The Geography of Brexit
Although we got the general pattern right, there were some places where – in relative terms – we substantially
under-estimated support for Brexit, and others where we over-estimated it. Where were those places, and why did
they deviate from the general pattern? To answer that question we adjusted our estimates so that the overall
outcome matched that of the referendum on 23 June and then explored the outliers; these were the places where
the actual percentage voting Brexit was either larger or smaller than we had predicted it would be on the basis of the
age structure and educational qualifications of the adult population in each local authority. The map shows those
places where we under- or over-estimated the outcome by five or more percentage points.
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Areas in blue are places where we under-estimated Brexit support. There were fifteen where the share for Leave
was ten or more points higher than we predicted; the largest of those differences was nearly 15 percentage points,
for Amber Valley District Council in Derbyshire. With two exceptions on the south coast (Portsmouth and
Southampton) and two more on the Thames estuary (Medway and Thurrock) these fifteen places have one common
characteristic – all are in the East or West Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber, or the Northeast. There are none in
the Northwest or Southwest of England – nor in London, Scotland or Wales. Indeed, of the 64 local authorities where
support for Brexit was five percentage points or more greater than we estimated there were only two in London
(Hillingdon and Newham) and two in Wales (Neath Port Talbot and Wrexham) and none in Scotland. By comparison,
twelve of the 64 were in the East Midlands (30 per cent of all local authorities in that region).
Areas in yellow are places were we over-estimated Brexit. There were 76 of these – in one case (East
Dunbartonshire) by as much as 24.4 points. Indeed, eighteen of those local authorities were in Scotland; all 32 of
Scotland’s local authorities returned a majority for Remain, and in over half of them support for Leave was
substantially less than we anticipated. London was also a region where support for Brexit was less than predicted
(only five boroughs returned a majority for Leave); thirteen of the Boroughs had an actual vote for Brexit five or more
percentage points lower than we predicted, as did nineteen of the 67 local authorities in the Southeast region.
These patterns suggest substantial regional variations within the UK in support for Brexit. But there were substantial
within-region variations as well – not everywhere in Scotland and London was as supportive of remaining in the EU,
for example. Nevertheless, across London’s 32 Boroughs on average support for Leave was 7.6 percentage points
less than we predicted and in Scotland average support across the 32 local authorities was 12.3 points less; against
that, in the East Midlands support for Brexit was on average 2.8 points greater than predicted across the region’s 40
local authorities.
Higher turnout, Higher Remain vote
As well as these regional variations, there were two other significant general patterns. On average, the higher the
turnout the less the support for Leave (with the regional differences held constant); turnout percentages are shown
in the next the map. With each percentage point increase in turnout support for Leave fell by 0.27 points. Across the
380 local authorities turnout varied from 56.3 per cent in Glasgow City to 83.6 per cent in Chiltern – which translates
into a difference of almost 7.5 percentage points in support for the Leave campaign between the places with the
highest and lowest turnout.
Finally, there were also substantial differences between local authorities in the number of people who registered as
electors there after the last annual canvass in late 2015. Lewisham’s registered electorate increased by 18.6 per
cent between December 2015 and June 2016, for example, and there was an increase of more than 10 per cent in
eight other local authorities; four of them were London boroughs and the others were Cambridge, Lincoln, Oxford
and Slough. The average local authority’s electorate increased by 4.7 per cent. There was a significant negative
relationship between expansion of the registered electorate and support for the Leave campaign (again, holding the
regional differences constant); for every increase of one percentage point in the registered electorate the Brexit vote
fell on average by 0.48 percentage points.
4/6
5/6
These regional differences, plus those linked to turnout variations and growth in the registered electorate, pose
important questions to be addressed as the referendum’s results go on to be analysed in more detail. Could higher
turnout in those where it was relatively low, plus greater efforts to ensure that more of those entitled to register to
vote did so, have delivered victory for the Remain campaign? (It is guesstimated that as many as 6-7 million voters
were not on the electoral roll and initial polls suggest that perhaps as many as two-thirds of the youngest age cohort
– 18-24 – did not cast a vote.)
Modelling the Brexit Vote
A general pattern emerged on 23 June very much in line with our earlier modelling. There are substantial parts of the
country where large numbers of people have lost out from the deindustrialisation and globalisation of the last few
decades of neo-liberal economic policies, and where the educational system has not helped large proportions of the
young to equip themselves for the new labour market. Increasing numbers in these disadvantaged groups were won
over during the last few decades by the campaigns in parts of the print media, taken up by UKIP since the 1990s,
linking their situations to the impact of immigration – uncontrollable because of the EU freedom of movement of
labour principle. The wider Leave campaign built on that foundation in 2016, producing the geography displayed
here.
In 1967 Peter Pulzer wrote that ‘Class is the basis of British party politics: all else is embellishment and detail’. The
result on 23 June clearly suggests that is still the case – class, as expressed through educational achievements,
delivered Brexit. The embellishment and detail – why so many young people did not either register to vote or, of
those who did, then express their opinion, for example – remain to be explored, as do their implications for the future
of British party politics.
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